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Current national statistics do not capture the true value 
of Myanmar’s hilsa fisheries. As a result, investment in the 
sustainable and inclusive management of its artisanal hilsa 
fisheries is limited. This study estimates the economic 
value of artisanal hilsa fisheries in Myanmar, using artisanal 
income data to estimate use value and a benefit transfer to 
estimate non-use value. Over ten years, implementing an 
incentive scheme that compensates artisanal fishers for 
compliance with new fishing regulations could yield a net 
benefit of between US$790 million and US$1.1 billion, 
with benefits outweighing costs by up to nine times. These 
benefits include an annual 5% increase in the income of 
artisanal fishers and maintenance of the existence value 
placed on hilsa by the wider population. Although this is 
a rough approximation of benefits compared with costs, it 
clearly demonstrates that an incentive scheme would be an 
economically beneficial management option.
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BDT Bangladeshi Taka 
CE choice experiment
CVM contingent valuation method
ES     ecosystem service/s
MMK Myanmar Kyat
NPV net present value
PES payment for ecosystem services 
PPP purchasing power parity
WTA willingness to accept
WTP willingness to pay
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Glossary
Administration costs: Fixed costs that are incurred 
in controlling and directing a specific project or 
organisation. In this context, these costs include 
governmental salaries for the people involved in 
the project.
Benefit–cost ratio (BCR): The relationship between 
the relative costs and benefits of a project, expressed 
in terms of the present value of benefits (the total 
discounted value of the benefits over time) divided by 
the present value of costs (the total discounted value 
of the costs over time). A BCR greater than 1.0 reflects 
economic benefits outweighing the costs.
Benefit transfer method: This process takes an 
estimation from one context and applies it to a similar 
environment. The original context, referred to as the 
‘study site’, is used to derive estimates for the site about 
which the new information is needed, referred to as the 
‘policy site’.
Choice experiment: This is a stated preference method 
based on the idea that consumers have preferences 
between different goods or services, depending on the 
attributes that the goods or services possess and the 
utility that the consumers derive from these attributes.
Contingent valuation method (CVM): This is a stated 
preference method that asks people to directly report 
their willingness to pay for a specific good or service, 
in order to determine the economic value of nonmarket 
resources.
Distance decay: The effect of willingness to pay 
declining as distance from the good or service to be 
paid for increases.
Environmental valuation: The practice of assigning a 
monetary value to nature and its goods or functions, 
with the purpose of incorporating or internalising 
environmental goods and services into markets 
or assessing compensation requirements for 
environmental losses.
Income elasticity: This is a measure of the extent 
to which willingness to pay is affected by changes 
in income.
Indirect utility function: U(x,Q) = v(P,Q,y) This shows 
the demand (x) where we assume that if price (P) 
and income (y) remain constant, a person will be 
happier when the level of environmental quality (Q) has 
improved. As demand is dependent upon the price of 
the good consumers want to buy and the income level 
that consumers have, we assume that an improvement 
(whether in quantity or quality) of the good will make 
a consumer happier, given that price and income do 
not change. 
Marginal (willingness to accept): The amount that 
individuals are willing to accept as compensation for 
a particular regulatory measure, as compared to a 
different level of regulation. This might be the difference 
between compensation payments for a 14 and a 21 day 
fishery closure. 
Non-use value: Also known as ‘existence value’, 
this is an appreciation of the intangible value of an 
ecosystem service.
Net present value (NPV): The difference between the 
present value of benefits (the total discounted value of 
the benefits over time) and the present value of costs 
(the total discounted value of the costs over time). A 
positive NPV represents economic viability.
Option value: This refers to people’s willingness to pay 
for preserving an environmental good or service for 
future use, even if they are unlikely to use it themselves.
Payment for ecosystem services (PES): A market-based 
mechanism that encourages conservation by providing 
incentives for actions that would improve or protect 
an environmental service. This incentive, whether 
monetary or otherwise, provides these incentives on 
the contract that a certain action will either begin (to 
encourage an ecological service) or cease (to prevent 
ecological harm). 
Purchasing power parity (PPP): A macroeconomic 
metric used to compare economic productivity between 
two countries by comparing goods and services 
and putting the currencies at par based on their 
respective prices.
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Stated preference methods: A range of methods 
used to inform environmental policy analysis, as they 
allow for measurement of willingness to pay (WTP) for 
environmental goods that do not exist in the market and 
measurement of non-use values that would otherwise 
not be included.
Transaction costs: Expenses incurred when buying or 
selling a good or service. In this context, these costs 
include the allocation, transport and distribution that are 
required for the incentive scheme to perform. 
Use value: This refers to ecosystem services that are 
for human consumption or production through direct or 
indirect use.
Willingness to accept: The minimum amount of money 
that a consumer is willing to accept for ceasing a 
behaviour, or the minimum amount that a seller is willing 
to accept to sell a good or service.
Willingness to pay: The maximum amount an individual 
is willing to provide for a specific good or service.
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Summary
While hilsa fish (Tenualosa ilisha) are integral to 
Myanmar’s national and local economies, current 
reported metrics do not accurately account for the 
value of artisanal, small-scale hilsa fisheries, leading 
to chronic underinvestment. This has resulted in 
high levels of exploitation and illegal, unreported 
and unregulated fishing, culminating in a hilsa stock 
decline that threatens the livelihoods of more than 
60,000 artisanal fishers in Myanmar, particularly in the 
Ayeyarwady Region.
This study uses valuation techniques and data to build 
a more accurate estimate of the value of Myanmar’s 
artisanal hilsa fisheries by assessing both use and 
non-use value. Addressing this knowledge gap provides 
a more accurate picture of what level of investment 
is necessary for improvement, and what could be the 
return on that investment. 
Using income reported by artisanal fishers in a 
socioeconomic survey, we estimated the direct income 
that is derived from hilsa outside of industrial fishing 
and secondary sales. Based on the total numbers of 
licensed and unlicensed artisanal fishers thought to 
derive income from hilsa, we estimated the total annual 
use value to be US$731.4 million. 
However, this only represents a percentage of the value 
that is derived from hilsa, as this estimate is based 
solely on income. We also estimated the non-use 
value of hilsa, both for those who are involved in the 
hilsa value chain and those who derive value from the 
existence of hilsa fisheries without actually using them. 
This value was calculated through a benefit transfer 
from non-use values estimated through a contingent 
valuation survey that asked people in Bangladesh 
what they would be willing to pay for a hilsa restoration 
programme. Willingness-to-pay estimates were adjusted 
to account for inflation, deriving a non-use value for 
individuals of US$0.68 per annum. This willingness-to-
pay estimate was applied to regional, subnational and 
national populations in Myanmar. For the Ayeyarwady 
Region’s artisanal fisher population, aggregating use 
and non-use value took our total estimated annual 
value to US$731.7 million. We also estimated annual 
value across all coastal states and regions of Myanmar, 
since the coastal population is expected to derive 
non-use value from hilsa, even if they are not involved 
in the fishing process: this came to US$788.4 million. 
Finally, we extrapolated a national annual value of 
US$867 million, assuming that the cultural significance 
of catching and eating fish would negate a possible 
distance decay factor.
In order to estimate the monetary compensation that 
hilsa fishers would require to comply with fishing 
regulations designed to protect hilsa, we used 
willingness-to-accept data from a choice experiment 
in the Ayeyarwady Region. We estimated the amount 
of compensation that hilsa fishers would require for 
compliance with various hypothetical fishing regulations, 
including new seasonal closures, seasonal net mesh 
size restrictions and establishing new sanctuary spaces. 
Based on these amounts, between US$17.5 million 
and US$22.1 million would be required annually 
to compensate all licensed artisanal fishers in the 
Ayeyarwady Region. 
We combined these figures with estimates of 
transaction and administration costs transferred 
from a food compensation scheme for hilsa fishers in 
Bangladesh, to estimate total costs of implementation. 
These came to between US$17.7 million and 
US$22.3 million per year if all licensed fishers in the 
Ayeyarwady Region were included. 
We then estimated the benefits of an increase in 
hilsa production over a ten-year time period in terms 
of expected impact on economic value. We based 
this expected increase on the annual 5% increase 
in hilsa production reported in Bangladesh following 
the introduction of its compensation scheme. Our 
cost–benefit analysis indicated that implementation of 
an incentive scheme for hilsa fishers would produce a 
high net present value (between US$790.4 million and 
US$1.1 billion) and a benefit–cost ratio of between 
5.7 and 9.3, meaning that an incentive scheme could 
generate benefits up to around nine times the cost of 
the scheme. 
This study outlines the economic imperative to 
sustainably manage artisanal hilsa fisheries. While it 
is difficult to establish a direct connection between 
incentive-based fisheries management and fish 
production, management techniques grounded in 
rigorous social and ecological research provide our best 
chance of protecting hilsa. Investment in compensation 
to offset or reduce the economic losses incurred by 
artisanal fishers when new regulations are introduced 
could generate significant economic returns alongside 
social and ecological benefits.
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The fisheries sector is pivotal to Myanmar’s national 
economy and food security. Fish accounts for 50% 
of the animal protein in the Myanmar diet and average 
consumption lies around 30kg per person annually 
(Belton et al. 2019; FAO 2018). Further, fishery exports 
are valued at US$538 million and employ 3.2 million 
people (Belton et al. 2019). Nearly half of the population 
resides in coastal states and regions and small-scale 
artisanal fisheries produce an estimated 1.65 million 
tonnes of fish annually – a figure which could in reality 
be much higher due to an unreported ‘hidden harvest’ 
in delta areas (DoF 2019; Kelleher et al. 2012). 
Considering the value of artisanal fisheries is therefore 
critical to understanding the total value of the fisheries 
sector, particularly in terms of employment (FAO 2018; 
Gregory et al. 2016). 
The hilsa shad (Tenualosa ilisha) has huge demand 
both nationally and internationally, with a high export 
value of US$32 million (DoF 2018). Hilsa are widely 
distributed throughout the Bay of Bengal and the 
majority of the total reported hilsa catch comes from 
inshore and offshore marine fisheries, in which both 
artisanal and industrial fishers operate (Hossain et al. 
2019). Moving between marine and fresh water for 
feeding and reproduction, hilsa have been known to 
travel up to 1,200km inland to spawn, particularly in 
the period from July to September (Baran et al. 2015; 
Bladon et al. 2019). They can therefore be found along 
the coast, in estuaries and in the Ayeyarwady and 
Toe rivers, but populations diminish in the Central Dry 
Zone of Myanmar, north of Hinthada (Baran et al. 2015). 
Hilsa are also caught in brackish and fresh waters on 
their upstream and downstream migrations. They are 
therefore critical for the livelihoods of artisanal fishers, 
particularly in the Ayeyarwady Region, where hilsa 
can represent more than 75% of fishing household 
income (Hossain et al. 2019; Khaing et al. 2019; 
Baran et al. 2017). 
Yet, while information is available on the value of hilsa 
to the national economy in terms of export revenues, 
the true economic value of Myanmar’s hilsa fisheries, 
including the artisanal sector, has not been quantified. 
The lack of value placed on these artisanal fisheries 
has resulted in a chronic problem of underinvestment, 
leading to limited monitoring and poor management 
(Leadbitter 2017). Despite the regulations in place 
across inshore marine and freshwater fisheries, hilsa 
are overexploited in the Ayeyarwady Region, probably 
due to an increasing level of illegal, unreported and 
unregulated fishing (BOBLME 2015; Dewhurst-
Richman et al. 2016). It is clear that urgent action must 
be taken to halt stock decline in the Ayeyarwady Region 
and management interventions must be underpinned by 
reliable, comprehensive and disaggregated monitoring, 
including direct sampling of artisanal hilsa catches 
and socioeconomic assessment of local communities 
(Soe et al. 2020; Merayo et al. 2020). Better data can 
not only provide a more accurate picture of what level 
of investment is necessary to strengthen management 
of hilsa and other fish stocks, but also allow the 
impacts of management interventions to be measured 
(Leadbitter 2017). 
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1.2 Aim and objectives
The Darwin Initiative-funded project Carrots and 
Sticks: Incentives to Conserve Hilsa Fish in Myanmar, 
also known as Darwin-HilsaMM, is seeking to address 
the threat of overfishing while protecting the livelihoods 
of small-scale fishing communities. Darwin-HilsaMM 
aims to design an economic incentive scheme, akin to 
Payment for Ecosystem Services (PES) in structure, 
that provides fishers with compensation for short-term 
economic losses incurred through compliance with new 
fishing regulations designed to maintain or increase 
hilsa populations. A similar scheme in Bangladesh has 
shown promising results in terms of both ecosystem 
and social resilience (Reid and Ali 2018).
It is crucial to understand who would be affected 
by implementation of this incentive scheme and 
how to balance participant needs with policy costs. 
This starts with understanding the context in which 
the scheme would be implemented and the level of 
investment required. The growing body of literature 
on implementation of PES schemes suggests that 
compliance rates hinge particularly on community 
input and acceptance (Barr and Mourato 2014). 
Equally important is determining an appropriate level 
of payment that can be sustained for as long as it 
is required (Engel et al. 2008). Payments must be 
sufficiently high to incentivise behaviour change, but 
not so high that they become inefficient or financially 
prohibitive in terms of the long-term funding of 
the scheme. PES schemes often face problems 
of permanence, where long-term environmental 
improvements are hindered due to a lack of funding 
(Engel et al. 2008). Similarly, some regulations may 
not impose enough of an economic cost on local 
fishers that they require an incentive. In these cases, 
payments are unlikely to be cost-effective. Thus, having 
a comprehensive understanding of the economic costs 
that local communities perceive to be associated with 
new regulations can ensure the effectiveness, efficiency 
and longevity of an incentive scheme. 
The main objectives of this paper are to:
1. Estimate a lower bound economic value for small-
scale, artisanal1 hilsa fisheries in Myanmar, in 
terms of income earned from hilsa fisheries in the 
Ayeyarwady Region
2. Estimate a range of upper bound economic 
values for Myanmar’s artisanal hilsa fisheries by 
incorporating the non-use value for hilsa at regional, 
subnational and national levels 
3. Determine an optimal level of compensation for 
artisanal fishers to incentivise compliance with hilsa 
fishing regulations 
4. Estimate the benefit–cost ratio and net present 
value of an incentive scheme for hilsa management 
in Myanmar 
1.3 Structure of the report
This report is comprised of four sections. Following 
this section, Section 2 describes the methodology 
used to estimate the economic value of hilsa and the 
level of compensation required for hilsa fishers in the 
Ayeyarwady Region. Section 3 presents and discusses 
the results of the study, including a lower bound 
estimate of economic value, a range of upper bound 
estimates of economic value, an estimate of the level 
of compensation required by artisanal fishers and an 
analysis of the relative costs and benefits of investing 
in an incentive scheme. Finally, Section 4 presents 
conclusions and recommendations. 
1 We use the terms small-scale and artisanal interchangeably to describe fisheries and fishers operating mainly in fresh water and inshore marine areas of 
Myanmar, as opposed to industrial fishers who mainly operate offshore (see Silvester et al. 2020 for more detail). 
MyanMar’s artisanal hilsa fisheries | How mucH are tHey really wortH?





The purpose of environmental valuation2 is to account 
for the values that go beyond a list of goods and 
services. An insufficient understanding of the different 
types of value attributed to an ecosystem can lead to 
policy that is inefficient in protecting all of the services 
it provides (Kenter 2016). Valuation studies should 
therefore attempt to account for that full scope by 
assessing the overall contribution to human wellbeing 
and the relative impact of changes or alternative actions 
(MA 2003). The total economic value framework 
encompasses use and non-use values of a particular 
ecosystem service (Pearce and Wardford 1993).
Use value and non-use value can be divided 
into categories based on the service provided 
(Figure 1). Use value refers to services that are for 
human consumption or production through direct use 
(eg fishing or tourism) or indirect use (eg regulating 
services such as nutrient cycling). Option value 
refers to people’s willingness to pay for preserving an 
environmental good or service for future use, even if they 
are unlikely to use it themselves. This category includes 
bequest value (the value of preserving something for 
future generations) and quasi-option value (the value of 
choosing not to take an irreversible step if information 
about alternative outcomes will be available in future). 
Non-use value is an appreciation of the intangible value 
of an ecosystem service (Wainger et al. 2018). This type 
of value can be held by both those who use and those 
who do not use a good or service directly. A prominent 
example of non-use value is existence value, which 
refers to the benefit people derive simply from knowing 
that something exists. Cultural services (eg recreation or 
appreciation of nature) are valued by people even if they 
cannot necessarily be bought or sold in a market and 
might fit in any of the categories.
2 Using the term environmental valuation, as opposed to economic valuation, simply specifies the type of goods and services that are evaluated: specifically, 
nature and its associated functions. For a more in-depth definition, see the Glossary. 
Drawing on a combination of primary data collected by the 
Darwin-HilsaMM project and secondary data reported by the 
Myanmar government and collected from literature, this study 
uses environmental valuation to estimate lower and upper 
bounds for the economic value of Myanmar’s artisanal hilsa 
fisheries. It then approximates the relative costs and benefits 
of implementing an incentive scheme for artisanal hilsa fishers 
in the Ayeyarwady Region.
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In this study, we estimated lower and upper bounds 
of economic value. For the lower bound estimate, we 
considered only (non-consumptive) direct use value 
by estimating income from artisanal hilsa fishing. For 
the upper bound estimates, we added non-use value, 
determined through a benefit transfer using data from a 
contingent valuation method (CVM)3 study conducted in 
Bangladesh. This addition of value attempts to account 
for existence and other cultural values that Burmese 
residents hold, even if they do not necessarily depend 
on hilsa for income or food security. We calculated 
the upper bounds at regional, subnational and national 
levels to ensure clarity in value and to demonstrate 
how focusing solely on the areas where hilsa are 
prevalent may obscure a significant amount of their 
economic value. 
2.1.1 Estimating the lower bound of 
hilsa value
We derived a lower bound of hilsa value from an 
estimate of average household income from hilsa 
fishing, multiplied by the total number of artisanal 
fishers thought to earn an income from hilsa fishing in 
the Ayeyarwady Region.4 While there is no exact figure 
for the number of these fishers, in 2019 there were 
63,000 artisanal fishers registered in the Ayeyarwady 
Region (DoF 2019). While not all target hilsa, most 
will catch hilsa at some stage. Silvester et al. (2020) 
estimated that there are likely to be the same number of 
people fishing without a licence. Thus, our lower bound 
assumes an estimated 126,000 fishers who derive an 
income from small-scale hilsa fishing.
While hilsa and hilsa products are caught, sold 
and distributed across Myanmar, this lower bound 
estimate only considers income from artisanal fishers 
in the Ayeyarwady Region. This lower bound estimate 
therefore excludes income from industrial (offshore) 
hilsa fishing and income from the sale of hilsa at 
secondary markets5 across Myanmar. It also excludes 
the consumptive value of hilsa and any non-use value of 
hilsa for fishers. 
We used primary income data reported by artisanal 
hilsa fisher households through a Darwin-HilsaMM 
socioeconomic survey carried out in early 2018 (Khaing 
et al. 2018). The survey collected quantitative data, 
including data on income, from 833 households in 
46 villages across four townships in the Ayeyarwady 
Region. Only households whose primary source of 
income comes from fishing were selected for interview. 
The townships in this survey were chosen because of 
their representation of different hilsa fishing conditions 
across the region: artisanal hilsa fishing takes place 
in coastal saline, brackish and freshwater conditions. 
This study also provided a sample similar to national 
and regional demographics, which suggests this survey 
sample could be considered representative of the wider 
population. A majority of surveyed households were 
considered poor (45%) or very poor (28%), with the 
remaining percentage (29%) classified as better off or 
middle class (Khaing et al. 2018). 
2.1.2 Estimating the upper bound of 
hilsa value
We calculated three alternative upper bound estimates 
of value by adding to our lower bound value an estimate 
of non-use value for the Ayeyarwady Region’s artisanal 
fishers, the coastal population of Myanmar and for the 
Myanmar population as a whole. The non-use value 
Figure 1. The Total Economic Value Framework, adapted from MA (Millennium Ecosystem Assessment) (2003)
3 Contingent valuation is a stated preference method where people are asked how much they are willing to pay for an improvement and/or how much 
compensation they would accept for the deterioration of a given ecosystem quality. For more detail, see Glossary.
4 While hilsa are also caught in Rakhine and Mon States, Yangon and Bago Regions (Baran et al. 2017), the Ayeyarwady Region is the most important region for 
hilsa fishing in Myanmar and the focus of the Darwin-HilsaMM project.













Use value Non-use value
Total Economic Value (TEV)
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was calculated based on a CVM study conducted in 
Bangladesh, by transferring the results to the Myanmar 
context using the benefit transfer method. 
Conducting a primary study can be a costly and time-
consuming process, and without sufficient time or 
budget, this can lead to inefficient or low quality studies 
(Johnston and Wainger 2015). In these circumstances, 
the benefit transfer method provides an efficient way 
of building reliable estimates by allowing for “the use 
of existing data or information in settings other than 
for what it was originally collected” (Rosenberger and 
Loomis 2003, p445). This process takes an estimation 
from a previous context and applies it to a similar 
environment. The original context, referred to as the 
‘study site’, is used to derive estimates for the place we 
need information about, referred to as the ‘policy site’ 
(Rosenberger and Loomis 2003). 
We used the benefit transfer method to adapt an 
estimate of non-use value for hilsa fisheries made for 
a comparable region of Bangladesh, using secondary 
data taken from a CVM study based on willingness to 
pay (WTP) (Mohammed et al. 2016). A total of 1,006 
households within five districts in Bangladesh were 
asked how much they would be willing to pay for a 
programme designed to restore hilsa populations.
Prior to applying the benefit transfer method, 
we assessed the potential for comparability 
and consistency of data between the study site 
(Bangladesh) and the policy site (Myanmar) to ensure 
a reliable transfer (see Box 1). We modified the data 
collected through the CVM study, which had revealed 
how much respondents would be willing to pay for an 
improvement in a given ecosystem quality, and used 
these values to determine the indirect utility function6 of 
the consumer for improvements to hilsa stocks. 
Two methods of benefit transfer are available: a unit 
value transfer and a benefit function transfer. A unit 
value transfer uses a single value or set value from 
the study site, while a benefit function transfer relies 
on transferring the function that statistically relates 
willingness to pay to characteristics of the ecosystem 
and the people whose values were elicited, thus not 
BOx 1. EnSuRInG RElIABIlIty Of thE BEnEfIt tRAnSfER
Prior to applying the benefit transfer method, we established the context and framework to ensure that the 
data from the study site (Bangladesh) were similar enough to data from the policy site (Myanmar) to create a 
reliable transfer (Bateman et al. 2011). In both countries, hilsa are one of the most exported seafood products; 
in Bangladesh hilsa generate around US$630 million in annual export revenues (Dewhurst-Richman et al. 
2016), while in Myanmar hilsa exports generate around US$32 million per year (DoF 2018). Fishing, and 
hilsa specifically, also provide a critical source of livelihoods in both countries. It is estimated that 2% of the 
total population of Bangladesh is directly or indirectly involved in the hilsa fishery (Bala et al. 2014). While no 
comparable statistics are available for Myanmar as a whole, at least 6% of the population is reportedly involved 
in the fisheries sector (DoF 2016). In the Ayeyarwady Region specifically, fishing contributes an average of 
63% of household income in coastal and delta communities and almost all artisanal fishers catch hilsa (MMRD 
2015; Khaing et al. 2018). 
As the national fish of Bangladesh, hilsa also hold a cultural significance in the country and are often consumed 
at religious festivals. In Myanmar, hilsa does not have comparable associations with religion, but it is a highly 
valued food (particularly the roe) and forms the traditional basis of its national dish, Mohinga rice noodles. 
Hilsa demonstrate similar migratory patterns in Bangladesh and Myanmar, migrating from the Bay of Bengal 
upriver for spawning. There are five major spawning grounds in Bangladesh, with the largest riverine nursery 
ground identified as the Meghna River (Bala et al. 2014). For their CVM study, Mohammed et al. (2016) 
sampled households in five districts of the Barisal Division, which has been identified as one of the districts 
containing major coastal rivers that are used as nursery grounds (Hossain et al. 2016).
Sharing a transboundary population of hilsa, both Myanmar and Bangladesh have experienced a decline in 
hilsa stocks. The CVM study in Bangladesh was not only designed to target the threat of overfishing from these 
same shared hilsa stocks, it also collected data from households with similar socioeconomic characteristics 
and livelihood challenges to those targeted in this study. This suggests that this study is viable for a 
valid transfer.
6 The indirect utility function shows the demand where we assume that if price and income remain constant, a person will be happier when the level of 
environmental quality has improved. For an in-depth explanation, see Glossary.
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including the original set values (Rolfe et al. 2015). 
We used the method of unit value transfer, which 
generally outperforms benefit function transfers when 
the study and policy site are highly similar (Rolfe et al. 
2015). Problems can arise when errors are found 
either in the original primary study or in the transfer 
process, and therefore unit value transfers require 
careful implementation to ensure data quality. However, 
transfers from CVM studies generally produce fewer 
transfer errors than other valuation methods (Kaul 
et al. 2013). 
To ensure validity of transfer (ie accuracy), we assessed 
WTP in the context of income data. Using site-specific 
measures of income in lieu of GDP per capita has been 
shown to increase transfer accuracy (Czajkowski and 
Ščasný 2010). Using income data from Mohammed 
et al. (2016), we identified what percentage of their 
income Bangladeshi respondents were willing to pay 
for hilsa restoration. We then transferred and attributed 
that percentage to the estimated average income of 
surveyed fishers in Myanmar, to estimate their WTP. 
Before the transfer was made, Myanmar income 
estimates were first adjusted to 2018 US$ values 
to ensure consistency between the upper and lower 
bound values in the Myanmar case. Then these values 
were adjusted with purchasing power parity (PPP) 
calculations for comparison (see Section 2.1.3). 
It is important to address how changes in income may 
affect WTP estimates. The literature suggests that 
an increase in income does not necessarily imply an 
increase in WTP (Broberg 2014). Further, studies 
that focus on consumption by poorer communities 
suggest that consumers living in poverty will often opt 
for alternatives that improve social welfare over their 
own individual utility (van Kempen et al. 2009). This 
suggests that poorer respondents may provide a high 
WTP because of their dependence on the ecosystem 
service (ES), and that a slight increase in income may 
not necessarily mean a change in WTP, especially if 
dependence on that ES is inflexible. These concerns 
suggest it is worthwhile to consider ‘income elasticity’ 
when determining whether or not WTP values are 
likely to change. In WTP calculations, income elasticity 
is a measure of the extent to which WTP is affected 
by changes in income, which may allow a better 
understanding of the dependence that consumers have 
on ES (see Section 3.2.1). 
Distance decay (the effect of respondents’ WTP 
value decreasing as their distance from the major 
area of interest increases) can greatly impact the 
calculated total benefit in CVM studies (Glenk et al. 
2019). This generally occurs when respondents are 
asked to address their WTP for use rather than non-
use of ecosystem services. Indeed, Mohammed et al. 
(2016) found that distance from rivers did not diminish 
respondents’ WTP for non-use of hilsa fisheries, but 
rather slightly increased it. This suggests that in the 
context of Bangladesh, distance decay did not factor 
into WTP for non-use of hilsa, probably because of ties 
to national and cultural identity, given that hilsa is the 
national fish of Bangladesh. 
In the Myanmar context, we first estimated the WTP of 
fishers who rely on hilsa for their income, have access 
to rivers, live in fishing villages and sell their fish to 
village-level collectors (Khaing et al. 2018). It is unlikely 
that distance decay can come into effect at this level. 
As these WTP values account for non-use of hilsa, they 
can be applied beyond the scope of those that depend 
on hilsa fisheries for their income. As those who do not 
derive direct income from hilsa fishing may still derive 
some non-use value from hilsa fisheries, distance decay 
may come into play as the non-use value estimates are 
expanded. However, if we acknowledge that hilsa also 
play a part in the culture of Myanmar as they do in the 
culture of Bangladesh (see Box 1), and we assume that 
the same effects experienced in the Bangladesh case 
could therefore be observed, we are able to extrapolate 
to a national value without including a distance 
decay factor.
2.1.3 Purchasing power parity 
We used the method of purchasing power parity 
(PPP) to standardise values in different currencies for 
comparison within this study. The method allows for 
a more reasonable comparison between countries by 
ensuring equal weight of value between currencies. 
Additionally, PPP represents the long-term value of the 
currency of a country, and so adjustments using PPP 
make national long-term value clearer than adjustments 
using regular exchange rates, which may undervalue 
investment (Ma et al. 2017). Empirical results from a 
2012 rank test7 suggest that PPP has shown long-term 
validity when used with East Asian countries, making 
them favourable for comparison (Chang and Su 2013). 
7 The study uses the Breitung rank test model, which tests for nonlinear cointegration for two or more time series, where sequences are compared. If there is 
cointegration between the two series, the sequences tend to converge, suggesting a relationship.
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2.2 Estimating willingness 
to accept compensation
We used data from a choice experiment, conducted as 
part of the Darwin-HilsaMM project in Myanmar in 2019, 
to estimate willingness to accept (WTA) compensation 
for compliance with new or more stringent fishing 
management policies designed to protect hilsa 
populations (Glenk et al. 2020). The survey was 
disseminated to 381 respondents in the Ayeyarwady 
Region, who were selected to overlap with those 
households from whom income data had previously 
been collected through a socioeconomic survey (Khaing 
et al. 2018). 
A choice experiment is another stated preference 
method8 based on the idea that consumers have 
preferences between different goods or services 
depending on the attributes that the goods or services 
possess and the utility that the consumers derive from 
these attributes (Louviere et al. 2000). The experiment 
format consists of choice sets, where respondents are 
asked to choose between alternatives. The alternatives 
each contain different attributes at different levels 
and hence respondents’ choice implies trade-offs in 
attributes across alternatives (Hoyos 2010). Choice 
experiments have been used previously to inform the 
design of incentive-based schemes and to understand 
preferences for management and compensation options 
(Hanley and Czajkowski 2019; Villanueva et al. 2017).
In this context, attributes in the choice experiment 
related to different hypothetical management changes 
that would protect hilsa populations, as well as different 
levels of monetary and in-kind compensation that 
they could receive. Management options included: 
(1) a closure that would last for seven days in one, two 
or three months in October, November and December; 
(2) sanctuary spaces for juvenile hilsa that would be 
placed every 9, 6 or 3 miles along the river; or (3) a 
requirement for an increase of fishing net mesh to 4.5 
inches for three months out of the year9 (see Glenk 
et al. 2020 for full methodological details of the choice 
experiment). We used the monetary compensation 
data from this study to estimate WTA values for our 
study. Participants in Glenk et al.’s experiment were 
offered the choice of six levels of compensation for 
these management options, ranging from US$30 to 
US$300. Scaling average individual WTP values up 
to the level of the Ayeyarwady Region’s artisanal fisher 
population allowed us to estimate the total amount of 
money that would be required to provide fishers with 
an incentive to comply with each of these hypothetical 
management changes.  
2.3 Cost-benefit analysis of 
a compensation scheme
Estimating the total costs and benefits of a programme 
allows the calculation of net present value (NPV) and 
benefit–cost ratio (BCR), which together provided an 
indication of overall value for money of an incentive 
scheme for artisanal fishers in Myanmar. NPV is 
a calculation of net benefit over the lifetime of a 
programme, and a positive NPV represents economic 
viability. BCR is used to understand the relative cost 
and benefit of the project, and a BCR greater than 1.0 
reflects economic benefits outweighing the costs.
To estimate the cost of implementing a compensation 
scheme, we considered the total monetary 
compensation that would be required by fishers, as 
well as the potential transaction and administration 
costs of delivering the compensation.10 To estimate 
the transaction and administration costs, we used 
those incurred by a food compensation scheme for 
hilsa fishers in Bangladesh (Haldar and Ali 2014). 
The scheme incurs costs relating to the selection of 
beneficiaries, transportation of the (food) compensation 
and staff wages required for allocation and distribution 
of compensation. The process for (and therefore cost 
of) distribution of compensation in Myanmar is expected 
to be quite similar to that in Bangladesh, where fishers 
use their ID cards to collect rice from local distribution 
points. Since access to bank accounts is not common 
among artisanal fishing communities in Myanmar, 
fishers would probably receive electronic transfers via 
a mobile app that would still require them to collect 
the cash from the office of a mobile financial services 
provider (eg Wave). It is probable that this cash would 
not be transported comparable distances to the food 
in Bangladesh, which can only be transported in its 
physical form, but there are likely to be additional costs 
associated with electronic transfers.
Rather than transfer these costs directly, we used the 
average cost incurred per household11 compensated 
in Bangladesh in 2014 (updated to 2018 values) 
8 Stated preference methods are regularly used to inform environmental policy analysis, as these approaches allow for measurement of WTP for environmental 
goods that do not exist in the market and measurement of non-use values that would otherwise not be included (Hanley and Czajkowski 2019).
9 In reality, any mesh size restriction should be permanent because it will require undersized nets to be destroyed.
10 We assumed no additional cost to establishing the new regulations that would be compensated for, since it is unlikely that these would be accompanied by an 
increase in enforcement effort; the incentives would be used instead of additional top-down enforcement.
11 Although this approach cannot account for the spread of fishers across administrative divisions, which may impact distribution spread, we used a per 
household cost rather than a total cost because the number of households compensated in 2014 in Bangladesh (226,852) was much higher than the number 
we are exploring in this study (63,000).
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and multiplied this by the number of people currently 
licensed to fish in the Ayeyarwady Region.12 
We added this cost to the total amount of compensation 
that would be required to compensate these fishers, 
based on WTA values (see Section 2.2). We ran 
the analysis for two hypothetical compensation 
scenarios: one which offered compensation for the 
three management measures described in Section 2.2 
with the highest WTA values,13 and one which offered 
compensation for the three management measures with 
the lowest WTA values.14 
To estimate the benefit of the scheme, we considered 
the scheme’s impact on our previously estimated 
lower bound of economic value (annual artisanal 
fishing income from hilsa in the Ayeyarwady Region) 
(see Section 2.1.1). Using the annual increase in 
hilsa production reported in Bangladesh following 
implementation of a similar scheme (Rahman et al. 
2020), we estimated an increase in hilsa fishery 
production of 5% per year for the first ten years 
of implementation.15 
It should be noted that direct causality between 
incentive-based management and increased hilsa 
production has been difficult to demonstrate. In reality, 
changes in productivity can also be influenced by 
other variables such as environmental change (Bladon 
et al. 2016). Furthermore, the fisheries regulations for 
which incentives were introduced in Bangladesh are 
not directly comparable to the hypothetical regulations 
under consideration in this study. Nonetheless, it is 
clear that incentive-based management has made a 
significant contribution to the hilsa stock recovery seen 
in Bangladesh (Dewhurst-Richman et al. 2016; Islam 
et al. 2016). Thus, for the purposes of this study we 
make the assumption that the increase in productivity 
was directly caused by incentive-based management 
and that the same impact would be expected in 
Myanmar. While a 5% increase in hilsa production 
would not necessarily lead to a concurrent 5% increase 
in hilsa income, without time series16 data on hilsa 
fishing income in Bangladesh over this period, it is our 
best approximation of impact.
We also calculated benefit in terms of our upper bound 
estimate of value, incorporating both artisanal use value 
and also national non-use value (see Section 2.1.2). 
Although we would expect this non-use value to stay 
constant annually and not be affected by an increase 
in productivity, without an intervention like this it is 
possible that hilsa populations would collapse, reducing 
existence value to zero. 
We calculated NPV and BCR over a ten-year time 
horizon, with annual costs and benefits both starting in 
the first year of implementation, and benefits (use value) 
increasing by 5% with each succeeding year, with a 
social discount rate of 7%. In the appraisal of projects 
seeking social benefits, a social discount rate reflects a 
society’s relative valuation on today’s wellbeing versus 
wellbeing in the future (Rambaud and Torrecillas 2005). 
The choice of an appropriate discount rate for cost–
benefit analysis of public and environmental projects has 
long been a contentious issue. Setting it too high can 
mean socially desirable projects appear economically 
inefficient, and setting it too low risks making 
economically inefficient investments (Zhuang et al. 
2007). Lower rates are often preferred for environmental 
projects, because they favour projects with benefits 
occurring in the more distant future (Thomas and 
Chindarkar 2019). For the purposes of this study, we 
used the interest rate charged to commercial banks and 
other financial institutions for the loans they take from 
the Central Bank of Myanmar (CBM 2020). 
2.4 Limitations 
These valuation techniques have limitations to what they 
can achieve. Values are often aggregated, transposed 
or expanded, and this use of generalisation can 
skew the magnitude at which the original values are 
relevant, leading to wide margins of error (Martínez and 
Bringas 2010). 
In this paper, values are considered within a specific 
context and the most relevant and accurate estimates 
are used with the intention of transparency and 
accuracy. However, any change of context or population 
may lead to error and so these values are useful for 
characterising the order of magnitude of the value of 
hilsa fisheries in relation to compensation requirements 
to facilitate fishery conservation. These values can 
therefore be used to inform strategic decisions 
regarding investments in fisheries management and 
conservation but should be used with caution for 
economic appraisals of specific management options.
12 Only licensed fishers would be eligible to participate in the incentive scheme. Our analysis therefore includes only the 63,000 people currently licensed to fish 
and does not account for unlicensed fishers potentially opting in in the future. 
13 The three measures with the highest WTA values are: 1) introduce a closed season for 21 days of fishing during peak fishing season; 2) increase fishing net 
mesh size requirements to 4.5 inches during peak fishing season; and 3) permanently close sanctuary areas to fishing every 3 miles along the river. 
14 The three measures with the lowest WTA values are: 1) introduce a closed season for 14 days of fishing during peak season; 2)  increase fishing net mesh size 
requirements to 4.5 inches during peak fishing season; and 3) permanently close sanctuary areas to fishing every 9 miles along the river.
15 After the first ten years of the incentive scheme for hilsa fishers in Bangladesh (2004/2005-2015/2016), there was a sharp rise in hilsa production from 
the annual 5% to 11%. This has been attributed to the introduction of other management interventions such as adaptive co-management, and so we did not 
consider changes beyond 2016.
16 A time series is a series of data points indexed (or listed or graphed) in time order.
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3 
Results and discussion
3.1 The lower bound 
estimate of value
Our lower bound estimate of value is based on the 
total non-consumptive use value of the Ayeyarwady 
Region’s artisanal hilsa fishery, which we equated to the 
total income from artisanal hilsa fishing in the region. 
On the basis of information collected by Khaing et al. 
(2018), full-time fishers can make anywhere between 
MMK2,100,000 and MMK3,650,00017 annually from 
hilsa fishing alone, depending on: whether fishers 
adhere to the closed seasons;18 and the market price 
of the hilsa, which is usually determined by weight 
and therefore varies seasonally. An average estimate 
from this study places the mean hilsa fishing income at 
MMK250,000 per month. Based on the assumption that 
fishers do adhere to the three-month closed season,19 
this equates to MMK2,250,000 annually. 
Using this average annual household income from hilsa 
fishing and assuming an estimated 126,000 fishers 
derive an income from artisanal hilsa fishing,20 we 
calculated the total estimated use value of hilsa fisheries 
in US$ using 2018 exchange rates (World Bank 2019a) 
(see Table 1).  
17 Myanmar Kyat (MMK) exchange rate in 2018 = US$1/MMK 1,429.808
18 Under the Freshwater Fisheries Law established in 1991, there is an official closed season for all freshwater and inshore marine fishing in the months of May, 
June, and July.
19 Survey participants generally said that they do cease fishing activities during the closed season, but it is possible that the result was influenced by participants 
not wishing to disclose sensitive behaviour, since anecdotal reports indicate that many people do fish during the closed season (Khaing et al. 2018). Our 
estimate of income is therefore a conservative one.
20 As noted in the methodology section, we based our estimate of total number of artisanal fishers on the number registered in the Ayeyarwady Region (63,000 
in 2019 according to DoF 2019) and the estimate provided by Silvester et al. (2020) of fishers operating without a licence (which he concluded was likely to be 
the same figure).
Here we identify upper and lower bounds of the economic 
value of artisanal hilsa fisheries. We then estimate how 
much compensation would be required by artisanal fishers 
in the Ayeyarwady Region to incentivise compliance with 
hilsa fishing regulations, before approximating the relative 
costs and benefits of such a compensation scheme. 
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3.2 The upper bound 
estimates of value
Our upper bound estimates of hilsa value are comprised 
of our estimate of non-consumptive use value (see 
Section 3.1) added to an estimate of non-use value 
determined through the benefit transfer method. We 
estimated non-use value at three scales: for artisanal 
fishers in the Ayeyarwady Region, for the wider coastal 
population of Myanmar (including Ayeyarwady Region) 
and for the national population of Myanmar.
3.2.1 Value derived from hilsa by 
artisanal fishers in the Ayeyarwady 
Region
As noted in the methodology section, the benefit 
transfer used data from a survey of households in a 
region of Bangladesh where hilsa are found, in which 
respondents were asked how much they would be 
willing to pay for a hypothetical habitat restoration 
programme (Mohammed et al. 2016). Both median and 
mean figures were available, representing lower and 
higher estimates of non-use value (see Table 2). As this 
is intended to be an upper bound estimate, we used the 
mean figure from the Bangladesh study, as this sets a 
maximum limit.
Average monthly household income of survey 
respondents in Bangladesh was estimated at 
BDT12,191 (Bangladeshi Taka),21 from a mix of 
livelihoods, and we multiplied this by twelve to obtain 
an annual estimate which, when converted and adjusted 
for inflation, came to US$1,967 (Table 2). This figure 
was slightly lower than that of fishers in the Myanmar 
survey, which showed an annual income of US$2,640 
(Khaing et al. 2018). This difference is not surprising, 
given that Mohammed et al. (2016) surveyed people 
with a range of different types of livelihood, whereas 
Khaing et al. (2018) surveyed only people who fish, 
including some people of a higher ‘social class’ who had 
significantly higher levels of income than others. 
The income elasticity of WTP for the Bangladesh study 
was calculated at 0.133, indicating inelastic demand 
for hilsa, which suggests that lower income groups 
are willing to pay more for hilsa restoration than those 
who have a higher income. This is probably because of 
their dependence on fishing as their primary source of 
income, whereas higher income groups have alternative 
income generation opportunities. Indeed, fishers are 
one of the most vulnerable communities in Bangladesh, 
and per capita annual income of hilsa fishers on the 
Padma River is 70% lower than the average per capita 
income of the population of Bangladesh as a whole 
(Sunny et al. 2019). Khaing et al. (2018) found that 
households in Myanmar that were identified to be in the 
‘lower’ social classes had lower income and tended 

















Mean WTP value 63.71 71.50 0.86 2.33
Annual income 146,290 164,178 1,967 5,355





















126,000 2,250,000 5,805 2,250,000 x 
126,000 fishers = 
283.5 billion
5,805 x 126,000 
fishers = 731.4 million
21 Exchange rate in 2018 =US$1/BDT 83.466
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to be more dependent on fishing as a primary source 
of income. We can therefore assume that income 
from hilsa is similarly inelastic in Myanmar as it is in 
Bangladesh, meaning that the variation in income level 
between the two studies is less important.
Adjusted estimates for Bangladeshi survey respondents 
show a PPP income of US$5,355 and an adjusted 
mean WTP value of US$2.33, accounting for 0.04% of 
annual income (an unadjusted WTP value of US$0.86). 
If we consider the estimated annual income from 
hilsa fishing in Myanmar, adjusted for PPP (which is 
US$5,805), these values reveal a much lower income 
disparity between the two regions than unadjusted 
income comparisons show, suggesting that values from 
the Bangladesh study are comparable to estimates 
derived from a primary study carried out in Myanmar. 
Assuming that Burmese fishers are willing to attribute 
0.04% of their unadjusted income as their WTP, we 
estimated a WTP value of US$0.68 and transferred this 
to the Myanmar case. Multiplied by the total number of 
fishers in the Ayeyarwady Region (126,000) this came 
to a total of US$85,680. 
We combined this value with the lower bound estimate 
from Section 3.1 to estimate a total annual unadjusted 
(use and non-use) value of US$198,364,320 derived 
by artisanal fishers in the Ayeyarwady Region (see 
Table 3). When adjusted for PPP, this value comes to 
US$731.69 million.
3.2.2 Value derived from hilsa by the 
wider coastal population
The non-use value derived by artisanal fishers in the 
Ayeyarwady Region is probably an underestimate of 
the total non-use value, as even those who do not 
participate in hilsa fishing gain non-use value from the 
hilsa. Particularly in coastal areas, where catching and 
consuming fish has particular cultural significance, 
people are likely to value the existence of artisanal 
hilsa fisheries (see Box 1). Myanmar’s coastline 
can be divided into three major coastal regions: 
the Rakhine coastline, the Deltaic coastline and the 
Tanintharyi coastline (FAO 2016). This encompasses 
six states: Rakhine, Ayeyarwady, Yangon, Bago, Mon 
and Tanintharyi. 
Given that we have used a non-consumptive use value 
and have not taken into account offshore fisheries and 
secondary markets, we can assume that this value will 
remain the same when assessing the total (use and 
non-use) value of artisanal hilsa fisheries to the wider 
coastal population. The total population of the coastal 
states and regions (including Ayeyarwady Region) is 
22,566,105 (see Appendix A). Using the same method 
employed above – ie a WTP value of US$0.68 – we 
estimated the non-use value derived by the total coastal 
population to be US$15.3 million. The total estimated 
value of hilsa fisheries, including non-use value, 
derived by the entire coastal population, is therefore 
US$213.7 million (Table 4). This value goes up to 
US$788.3 million when adjusted for PPP (Table 4).
Table 4. Calculation of total annual value derived from hilsa by the coastal population of Myanmar
AnnuAl uSE vAluE 
DERIvED By ARtISAnAl 
fIShERS In thE 
AyEyARWADy REGIOn  
(uS$)
AnnuAl nOn-uSE 
vAluE DERIvED By 
COAStAl POPulAtIOn  
(uS$)
tOtAl AnnuAl vAluE 




vAluE DERIvED By 
COAStAl POPulAtIOn, 
ADjuStED fOR PPP 
(uS$)
198.3 million 0.68 x 23,974,506 = 16.3 
million




Table 3. Calculation of total annual value derived from hilsa by artisanal fishers in the Ayeyarwady Region
AnnuAl uSE vAluE 
DERIvED By ARtISAnAl 
fIShERS fROM hIlSA 
fIShInG (uS$)
AnnuAl nOn-uSE 
vAluE DERIvED By 
ARtISAnAl fIShERS 
(uS$)
tOtAl AnnuAl (uSE 
AnD nOn-uSE) 




vAluE DERIvED By 
ARtISAnAl fIShERS, 
ADjuStED fOR PPP 
(uS$)
1573.64 x 126,000 fishers 
=  
198.3 million 
0.68 x 126,000 fishers = 
85,680
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3.2.3 Value derived from hilsa by the 
wider national population
Assuming that distance decay does not factor into 
non-use value estimates (see Section 2.1.2), we used 
the population of Myanmar, which was 53,708,395 
in 2018 (World Bank 2019b), to calculate a figure of 
US$234.8 million for the total use and non-use value 
of hilsa fisheries for the entire Myanmar population, 
which increased to US$867 million when adjusted for 
PPP. This upper bound is a conservative estimate of the 
total economic value of hilsa fisheries to the nation and 
illustrates the true scale at which changes to artisanal 
hilsa fisheries could operate. 
3.3 Willingness to accept 
compensation
As noted in the methodology, we estimated the 
monetary investment that would be required to 
compensate hilsa fishers for compliance with new 
regulations by using the results of a choice experiment 
conducted in Myanmar in 2019 to estimate willingness 
to accept (WTA) compensation for compliance 
with new or more stringent fishing management 
policies designed to protect hilsa populations (Glenk 
et al. 2020). 
Glenk et al. (2020) identified four management options 
to produce statistically significant WTA values: (1) a 
closure that would last for seven days in two months, 
amounting to a total of 14 days; (2) a closure that would 
last for seven days in three months, amounting to a 
total of 21 days; (3) an increase of fishing net mesh 
to 4.5 inches for three months out of the year; and (4) 
sanctuary spaces for juvenile hilsa that would be placed 
every 3 miles along the river. The significant WTA values 
indicated that the economic losses imposed by these 
management options were perceived to be high enough 
to require compensation, with the change in fishing net 
mesh size requiring the most compensation and the 14 
day closed season and sanctuary spaces requiring the 
least (Table 6). 
All but one of the management options in Table 6 
required cash compensation amounting to less than 
one month of estimated average income from hilsa 
fishing. For example, while the choice experiment 
indicated that fishers would be willing to accept 
US$73 in compensation for a 21-day fishing ban, 
survey data indicate that fishers in Myanmar have the 
potential to earn US$79 per month from hilsa during 
peak fishing season,22 and so if fishing were closed for 
three weeks of this season, fishers could potentially 
lose US$236 (Khaing et al. 2018). The discrepancy 
between these two values could partially be due to 
limited opportunity for alternative income generation, 
creating a willingness to accept even low amounts of 
compensation over none at all (Grutters et al. 2008). 
It could also be due to the hypothetical timing of the 
21-day fishing ban in the choice experiment, during 
the period from October to December, since the main 
festival in October (Thadingyut) is likely to reduce 
compensation requirements.
An increase in minimum net mesh size for three months 
of the year had the highest WTA value and was the 
only management option for which choice experiment 
participants required more compensation, on average, 
than estimated income earned from hilsa in one month. 
This is probably because the proposed change would 
be in place for the longest period of time and during 
peak fishing season, when hilsa catch and income are 
at their highest. If the entire artisanal fisher population of 
the Ayeyarwady Region were to be compensated for this 
management option, we estimate that this compensation 
would total just over US$30 million annually. If the 
same number of people were compensated for new 
hilsa sanctuaries spaced every three miles along the 
river, or for an additional closed season of 14 days 
over two months, each measure would total just over 
US$5 million annually. 
Table 5. Calculation of total annual value derived from hilsa by the national population of Myanmar
AnnuAl uSE vAluE 
DERIvED By ARtISAnAl 
fIShERS In thE 
AyEyARWADy REGIOn  
(uS$)
AnnuAl nOn-uSE 
vAluE DERIvED By 
nAtIOnAl POPulAtIOn 
(uS$)
tOtAl AnnuAl vAluE 
DERIvED By nAtIOnAl 
POPulAtIOn  
(uS$)
tOtAl AnnuAl vAluE 
DERIvED By nAtIOnAl 
POPulAtIOn 
ADjuStED fOR PPP 
(uS$)
198.3 million 0.68 x 53,708,395 = 
36.52 million
198,278,370 + 
53,708,395 =  
234.8 million
867 million
22 Defined by Khaing et al. (2019) as the period from September to January.
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Management options that were not found to be 
statistically significant by Glenk et al. (2020) cannot 
be effectively translated into WTA values, with the 
exception of sanctuary spaces every nine miles along 
the river, which revealed a negative estimate indicating 
that no compensation would be necessary for this 
particular management measure. This observation was 
supported by reports from some respondents of pre-
existing self-imposed sanctuary spaces, enforced at the 
community level. It is therefore important to note that as 
long as sanctuaries are placed at appropriate intervals 
along the river they can be used in combination with any 
of the other management options with no additional cost 
in compensation. 
3.4 The net benefits of 
investing in an incentive 
scheme
By approximating the total costs and benefits of an 
incentive scheme for artisanal fishers in Myanmar, we 
calculated the net present value (NPV) (ie net benefit) 
and benefit–cost ratio (BCR) of such a scheme over a 
ten-year period. 
We supplemented our estimate of the total amount 
of compensation required (Section 3.3) with 
transaction and administration costs incurred by a food 
compensation scheme in Bangladesh in 2014. These 
came to BDT33.33 million or an average of BDT146 per 
household compensated (Haldar & Ali 2014). Updated 
to 2018 values, this comes to an average of US$2.23 
per household. Compensating all 63,000 licensed 
artisanal fishers in the Ayeyarwady Region of Myanmar 
Table 6. Mean marginal23 willingness to accept (WTA) per household per year and total annual compensation required for the 
Ayeyarwady Region’s artisanal fisher population for four survey attributes (management options) presented to respondents 






















season of 7 days per 
month for 2 months 
(14 days total)
56,920 40 6.8 billion 5 million 2%
Additional closed 
season of 7 days per 
month for 3 months 
(21 days in total)
104,060 73 12.5 billion 9 million 4%
An increase in fishing 
net mesh size to 4.5 
inches for 3 months of 
the year
340,700 238 50 billion 30 million 13%
Establishment of 
sanctuary areas 
spaced every three 
miles
57,030 40 6.8 billion 5 million 2%
* As modelled by Glenk et al. (2020). Survey attributes that did not produce statistically significant coefficients are not presented here, as 
they could not effectively be translated into WTA values. 
** Estimates based on an estimated population of 126,000 fishers in the Ayeyarwady Region (Silvester et al. 2020).
23 The marginal WTA is the amount that individuals are willing to accept as compensation for a particular regulatory measure, as compared to a different level of 
regulation. 
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would therefore incur an annual total of US$140,602 in 
transaction and administration costs. 
If compensation were provided for the three hypothetical 
management options that were perceived to require 
the lowest compensation amounts (incentive scenario 
one in Table 7),24 individual fishers would require an 
annual total of US$278. Together with transaction and 
administration costs, this would scale up to a regional 
total of US$17.7 million per year. If compensation 
were provided for the three hypothetical management 
options that were perceived to require the highest 
compensation amounts (incentive scenario two in 
Table 7),25 individual fishers would require an annual 
total of US$351 according to the results in Section 3.3. 
If all licensed artisanal fishers in the Ayeyarwady Region 
were compensated, this would scale up to an annual 
total of US$22.3 million, including transaction and 
administration costs. 
Table 7 demonstrates a significant return on investment 
in an incentive scheme across a range of compensation 
levels, whether benefits are considered in terms of 
impacts on our lower bound estimate of value (income 
derived from hilsa by artisanal fishers in the Ayeyarwady 
Region) or impacts on our upper bound estimate 
of value (artisanal fisher income combined with the 
non-use value derived from artisanal hilsa fisheries by 
the wider national population). We estimate that, over 
ten years, investing between US$132.7 million and 
US$167.2 million could yield a total discounted benefit 
of between US$957.6 million and US$1.2 billion. 
Under incentive scenario one (the lowest compensation 
amount) and considering benefits in terms of use and 
national non-use value, the NPV of a compensation 
scheme is US$1.1 billion and the BCR is 9.3, indicating 
that the benefits outweigh costs by more than nine 
times. At the lower end of the scale, when the greatest 
compensation amounts are provided (incentive scenario 
two) and benefits are considered in terms of`regional 
artisanal use value alone, the NPV is US$790.4 million 
and the BCR is 5.7, which is still well above the 1.0 
measure for programme viability. 
These results show that investment in a compensation 
scheme would be economically viable, regardless of the 
compensation amounts that are likely to be required. 
It should also be noted that although this cost–benefit 
analysis was conducted using a social discount rate 
of 7%, net benefits remain positive even with much 
higher discounting.26 





BEnEfIt (uSD) nPv BCR
Incentive scenario one
Lower bound value 132.7 million 957.6 million 824.9 million 7.2
Upper bound value 132.7 million 1.2 billion 1.1 billion 9.3
Incentive scenario two 
Lower bound value 167.2 million 957.6 million 790.4 million 5.7
Upper bound value 167.2 million 1.2 billion 1.1 billion 7.4
24 Introduce a closed season for 14 days of fishing during peak fishing season, increase fishing net mesh size requirements to 4.5 inches during peak fishing 
season, and permanently close sanctuary areas to fishing every 9 miles along the river.
25 Introduce a closed season for 21 days of fishing during peak fishing season, increase fishing net mesh size requirements to 4.5 inches during peak fishing 
season, and permanently close sanctuary areas to fishing every 3 miles along the river.
26 For example, under incentive scenario two and considering benefits in terms of use value alone, a discount rate of 35% gives a NPV of US$348.93 million and 
a BCR of 5.28.
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We estimate that the economic value of Myanmar’s 
artisanal hilsa fisheries could be as high as 
US$867 million per year. This estimate includes values 
previously undocumented in national metrics: our lower 
bound estimate of value, based on the total income 
derived from hilsa by artisanal fishers in the Ayeyarwady 
Region (US$731.7 million), as well as estimates of non-
use value derived from hilsa by the national population. 
It should be noted that even our upper bound estimate 
of economic value is conservative, since it assumes that 
artisanal fishers comply with the current closed season 
and does not include income derived from hilsa by 
fishers outside of the Ayeyarwady Region.27 
The importance of hilsa to artisanal fishers, in 
terms of income generated, highlights the scale of 
socioeconomic return that could be generated through 
increased investment in sustainable management 
of artisanal hilsa fisheries. But our calculations also 
indicate the wider value that coastal populations and the 
nation as a whole place on the existence of hilsa stocks, 
and therefore the critical importance of protecting them. 
Our research indicates that artisanal fishers in the 
Ayeyarwady Region would be willing to participate in an 
incentive scheme for hilsa fisheries management and 
that some management options were less acceptable 
than others, requiring higher levels of compensation. 
WTA values indicated that individual fishers would 
require a minimum of around US$278 per year in cash 
compensation for the three hypothetical management 
options that were perceived to require the highest 
compensation amounts (ie introduce a closed season 
for 14 days, increase fishing net mesh size requirements 
and permanently close sanctuary areas to fishing every 
nine miles along the river); and a maximum of US$351 
for the three hypothetical management options that were 
perceived to require the highest compensation amounts 
(ie introduce a closed season for 21 days, increase 
fishing net mesh size requirements and permanently 
close sanctuary areas to fishing every three miles along 
the river).
Our approximation and analysis of the costs and 
benefits of these hypothetical incentive schemes 
demonstrate that, despite their cost (between 
US$17.7 million and US$22.3 million per year if 
all licensed fishers in the Ayeyarwady Region were 
included), they would be an economically rewarding 
investment. Depending on how the benefit–cost 
ratio was calculated, benefits outweighed costs by 
between five and nine times and the net present value 
of the schemes ranged from US$790.4 million up 
to US$1.1 billion. Furthermore, a previous study has 
demonstrated how the costs could be funded through 
fiscal reform (Silvester et al. 2020). By increasing the 
efficiency of revenue collection from the hilsa value 
chain and adapting current tools to better target actors 
nearer the top of the hilsa value chain, the government 
of Myanmar could triple current revenues available for 
fisheries management, generating more than enough 
27 There is also artisanal hilsa fishing in Rakhine and Mon States and Yangon and Bago Regions (Baran et al. 2017).,
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additional funds to cover the annual total costs of 
incentive-based management. 
It is important to note that the management measures 
proposed in Glenk et al. (2020)’s choice experiment 
were hypothetical, and are not necessarily the 
management measures that should be implemented 
in practice.28 Careful location-specific assessments 
will be required to refine appropriate compensation 
amounts once specific regulations have been identified 
for implementation. We also acknowledge that the 
implementation of the proposed management measures 
will not necessarily guarantee a comparable increase 
in hilsa populations to that reported in Bangladesh. 
However, it is clear that current management measures 
do not adequately protect hilsa and a new approach 
is required (Bladon et al. 2019). Incentive-based 
fisheries management has great potential both to halt 
the overexploitation of hilsa in Myanmar and reduce 
vulnerability of artisanal fishers by compensating 
them for short-term economic losses incurred through 
compliance with new regulations (Bladon et al. 2016; 
Dewhurst-Richman et al. 2016). The results from this 
study demonstrate that, in the context of the value that 
is derived from these fisheries, incentives to support 
fishing regulations grounded in rigorous ecological and 
biological understanding of hilsa would be a worthwhile 
and cost-effective investment.
28 Two studies have since been published that provide policy recommendations based on new understanding of the spawning seasonality and migratory routes of 
hilsa in the Ayeyarwady Region (Bladon et al. 2019; Merayo et al. 2020).
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Appendix A 
Population figures for 
the coastal states and 
regions of Myanmar, 
according to the 2014 
census data
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Current national statistics do not capture the true value 
of Myanmar’s hilsa fisheries. As a result, investment in the 
sustainable and inclusive management of its artisanal hilsa 
fisheries is limited. This study estimates the economic value 
of artisanal hilsa fisheries in Myanmar, using artisanal income 
data to estimate use value and a benefit transfer to estimate 
non-use value. Over ten years, implementing an incentive 
scheme that compensates artisanal fishers for compliance 
with new fishing regulations could yield a net benefit of 
between US$790 million and US$1.1 billion, with benefits 
outweighing costs by up to nine times. These benefits include 
an annual 5% increase in the income of artisanal fishers and 
maintenance of the existence value placed on hilsa by the 
wider population. Although this is a rough approximation of 
benefits compared with costs, it clearly demonstrates that 
an incentive scheme would be an economically beneficial 
management option.
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